The Use of Non-Military Elements of Statecraft by China during Cambodian Crisis 1997 by Witjaksono, Witjaksono
     Dinamika Global | Volume 01 | No.1 | Juni 2016 
6 
THE USE OF NON-MILITARY ELEMENTS OF STATECRAFT BY CHINA 
DURING CAMBODIAN CRISIS 1997 
Witjaksono 
Abstrak 
 Rekognisi atas kedaulatan suatu negara merupakan bagian dari 
kebijakan luar negeri yang dalam decision making process-nya pasti 
mempertimbangkan cost dan benefit. Proses mempertimbangkan kebijakan 
luar negeri akan semakin sulit dilakukan apabila rekognisi atas kedaulatan 
tersebut dilakukan terhadap negara yang sedang mengalami krisis. Saat 
Kamboja mengalami krisis pada tahun 1997, Tiongkok mengambil langkah 
strategis dengan memberikan rekognisi terhadap kedaulatan Kamboja. 
Walaupun Tiongkok memberikan rekognisi dalam bentuk yang tidak empiris, 
dalam hal ini elemen-elemen non-militer, namun terbukti bahwa bentuk 
rekognisi semacam itu sudah cukup untuk memberikan dampak berupa 
keuntungan strategis terhadap kedua negara khususnya Kamboja sebagai 
negara yang sedang mengalami krisis. Penelitian ini akan menggambarkan 
best practices dari upaya sebuah negara dalam memberikan rekognisi atas 
kedaulatan negara lain, melalui elemen-elemen yang bersifat non militer. 
Pada akhirnya, penggunaan elemen-elemen non-militer merupakan hal yang 
berpotensi dalam memberikan dampak strategis terhadap rekognisi yang 
dilakukan bagi negara yang sedang mengalami krisis.  
Kata kunci : Elemen-elemen non-militer, Tiongkok, krisis Kamboja.   
Introduction 
 In the aftermath of the July 1997 “coup” in Phnom Penh that ousted 
the Cambodian first prime minister Norodom Ranariddh, the only country 
that recognized both the Royal kingdom and the Royal Governement of 
Cambodia  was the people’s Republic of China. Prior to the coup, the Royal 
Governmement of Cambodia had been a unique coalition government 
headed by two  prime ministers.  
On Tuesday, July 8th, 1997 Phnom Penh’s non profit independence 
newspaper, the Cambodia Daily, printed a Chinese Embassy statement 
recognizing the Royal Government of Cambodia led solely by the Second 
Prime Minister Hun Sen (Witjaksono, 1997). 
With the first Prime Minister Norodom Ranariddh in exile, not all 
embassies in Phnom Penh were as quick to make public their diplomatic 
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statement as China’s Embassy. In the following days the internasional 
reactions to Hun Sen legitimacy were varied. Some governments chose to 
evacuate their nationals while several others suspended their development 
assistance to Cambodia as a rebuke to what was commonly reported as 
“Hun Sen’s bloody seizure of power.” (Curtis, 1998). On July 10, 1997 the 
Association of South East Asia Nation (ASEAN) foreign ministers (excluding 
Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia) decided to reconsider Cambodia’s entry as a 
full member of the regional organization. After winning the 1998 election 
and becoming the only prime minister in the Kingdom of Cambodia, Hun 
Sen led the country into stability. In February 1999 Hun Sen paid an official 
visit to Beijing. Hun Sen obtained $ 18.3 milion in foreign assistance 
guarantees and $200 milion in no-interest loans for Infrastructure projects.  
China summarized that the $218.3 milion in aid was among the highest aid 
they provided to any country in the world (Marks, 2000). After the July 1997 
“coup” and amid the sanctions imposed on the Hun Sen Regime by other 
nations, China’s recognition of Cambodia displayed strong diplomatic 
support for the government and reinforced its strategic position as the 
leading nation in Southeast Asia. This case study will explore how China 
effectively influences Cambodia using the non –military element of 
statecraft. 
The Coalition Government 
After the United Nations Transitional authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) 
election, the Royal Government of Cambodia was formally established in 
November 1993 with FUNCINPEC (Front Uni National pour un Cambodge 
Independant, Neutre, Pacifique, et Cooperatif, which translates to : National 
United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative 
Cambodia) led by Prince Norodom Ranariddh as the first prime minister and 
CPP (Cambodian Peoples Party) led by Hun Sen as the second prime 
minister, and co-ministers from both  parties headed by the Ministries of 
Defense and Interior/National Security. Other co-ministerial portfolios were 
divided between FUNCINPEC and the CPP, with one ministry (Information 
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and culture) allocated to the Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party (BLDP) 
(Curtis, 1998). The real controller of the offices was the CPP. 
The Sweeping Operation 
On Saturday, July 4, 1997, the CPP Major General Ek Sarath 
informed some Defense Attache’s offices that on the 5th of July the Royal 
Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) was going to launch a sweep operation in 
Phnom Penh. The operation objective, as he explained, was to cleanse the 
city from Khmer Rouge element who were welcomed by the unilateral 
FUNCINPEC’s ranariddh policy. On July 5, 1997 a C-130 belonging to the 
Indonesian airforce was on the way from Bangkok to Pochentong airport in 
Phnom Penh carrying 30 Indonesian National Police trainers and recruits 
personnel. The C-130 was about to land when the tower control ordered the 
incoming flight to make a turn back and seek an alternative airport in the 
province.  
The Pochentong civilian and military airport had been attacked by 
FUNCINPEC General Nhek Bun Chhay’s troops. The attack on Pochentong 
airport was General Nhek Bun Chhay’s pre-emptive strike against Hun Sen’s 
sweep operation. The battle eventually reached Ranariddh;s residence 
located just behind the Indonesian Defence Attache’s Office and involved 
infantry, tanks, armored personnel carriers, and mortars that terrorized 
Phnom Penh’s one milion residents. Ranarridh was out of the country, and 
he did not return until nearly a year later. Following the fighting, Hun Sen 
claimed that Taiwan had been covertly supporting the FUNCIPEC forces, 
and he promptly expelled Taiwan’s unofficial liaison officers from Phnom 
Penh (Marks, 2000). 
China-Cambodia Relationship 
On May 22, 1992 two UNTAC soldiers from a Chinese Engineer 
Detachment were killed and seven other wounded in Kompong Thom 
province as a result of Khmer Rouge (KR)’s shelling. This attack marked the 
first bitter experience in the relationship between the KR and China as a 
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traditional KR’s supporter. China also noted that tke KR no longer 
maintained its loyalty toward China since the 5-6 July crisis after a secret 
triangle relationship between Taiwan- Ranarridh loyalist troops and an ex-
Khmer Rouge soldier. 
“Hun sen wrote in a 1988 essay that China was the root of all was evil 
in Cambodia. But Just a Cambodia and Cambodians are 
demonstrating an almost unfathomable capacity to let bygones be 
bygones with regard to the former khmer Rouge, Hun Sen has now 
buried the past and embracing China, which he sees as a means of 
bringing economic development to Cambodia” (Marks, 2000). 
 
The 5-6 July “Coup” 
The UN Initiative to stabilize Cambodia by installing two Prime 
Ministers failed because the power sharing arrangement did not result in 
equal power for both. Within the first three years after election the coalition 
government succeeded in maintaining national security throughout 
Cambodia. For the first time the new RCAF that consisted of three different 
warring factions had fought tohether against the Khmer Rouge. But when 
the second prime minister Hun Sen inaugurated the 911 Commando 
Regiment on November 9th, 1999 a new problem arose. The coalition system 
didn’t work at all with these elitetroops since the leadership of the regiment 
was always tied to CPP generals. The coalition agreed to extend the power 
sharing up to the district level, resulting in two chiefs of district in remote 
areas. But this division was hard to apply because actual administrative 
control was in the hands of the CPP. The power sharing arrangement didn’t 
translate to equal power control. The physical outlook for the coalition 
government was far from credible, especially for FUNCINPEC. Having 
recently re-entered Phnom Penh after 30 years fighting, that exhausted 
Cambodia’s revenue, every minister and general was forced to be creative in 
funding their efforts. The common and easy means for generating revenue 
was by selling Cambodian natural resouces. Each side multed some foreign 
investors to create business concessions in mining and forestry. The 
Cambodia conflict eventually became a proxy competition between China 
and Taiwan. The existence of Taiwan’s unofficial liaison office in Phnom 
     Dinamika Global | Volume 01 | No.1 | Juni 2016 
10 
Penh was not as popular as before it had been expelled by Hun Sen. But in 
the business arena, the Taiwanase, the Chinese and some other ASEAN 
countries businessmen were brutally competing to obtain Cambodia’s 
mining and foresty concessions.  
The Chinese and Taiwanese businessmen had become the prominent 
lobbyists that bridged the gap inside the coalition government. FUNCINPEC 
generals used the huge profits that resulted from the business competition 
to fortify their troops with brand new weaponry. FUNCINPEC troops guarded 
mining and foresty resources that formed the basis of funding and allowed 
them to maintain parity with CPP troops. As a result Hun Sen’s claim 
Taiwan had been covertly supporting FUNCINPEC’s forces was no longer 
questioned. 
Aftermath of 5-6 July “Coup” 
 Amid the sanctions, Hun Sen’s quick action to stabilize Cambodia 
convinced the international communities to begun accepting Hun Sen’s 
power grab as a fait accompli. With only China’s recognition in hand but 
armed with a strong personality and a talent for rhetoric, Hun Sen declared 
eight rules to restore the security and to stabilize Cambodia. These eight 
rules included forbidding embassy vehicles to apply dark tint to glass 
windows. Hun Sen’s intelligence had discovered that some unfriendly 
embassies were hosting Ranariddh’s loyalist when the 5-6 July crisis broke 
out. Hun Sen also removed illegal military men from some check points who 
frequently exorted money. He also convinced the international human rights 
tribunal that he did not commit human rights violations during the 5-6 July  
crisis. At the end of September 1997, Hun Sen’s Chief of Cabinet led another 
delegation to China to meet with the Chinese Trade Minister and other 
officials to draft a memorandum of understanding on assistance for 
agriculture, power, fisheries, and maritime transport.  
In December, China delivered 116 military cargo trucks and 70 jeeps 
valued at $2.8 million in what both sides claimed was part of a deal that 
pre-dated the events of 5 and 6 July. At the ceremony to receive the 
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vehicles, Hun Sen praised China’s sympathetic attitude toward post-July 
Cambodia (Marks, 2000) 
China’s Role in Cambodia 
 The use of the accurate and timely non-military elements of statecraft 
by China during the turmoil in Cambodia in 1997 was the keystone of 
China’s future influence in the Southeast Asia region. China utilized Sun 
Tzu’s theories in its relationship with the Khmer people from the beginning 
of the history of the Kingdom of Kambu, during the Pol Pot era, and the CPP. 
It was Sun Tzu who emphasized the importance of soft power to defeat the 
adversary before it is necessary to use a weapon. China succesfully used at 
least three elements of non military statecraft to defeat Hun Sen, who used 
to hate China. 
Element Number 1 : Diplomatic Initiative  
Hun Sen’s initiative to seek diplomatic support from the 
international community collided with China’s ambition to be the 
single influential player in Cambodia. Unlike Thailand’s military coups 
that had always received King Bhumibol Adulyadej’s pardon or 
blessing after the coup, Hun Sen struggled to obtain recognition after 
the 5-6 July crisis. In an attempt to gain support, he ordered his 
generals to initiate a diplomatic approach by contacting ASEAN 
embassies in Phnom Penh.  
Hun Sen’s envoys had tried to persuade ASEAN nations not to 
leave Cambodia by guaranteeing the safety and security of diplomats 
and foreigners. In fact, the battle in Ranariddh’s residence did not 
damage the diplomatic compound around it. The ASEAN reaction was 
disappointing to Hun Sen. On July 9, 1997 Singapore and Thailand 
sent their C-130’s to evacuated their nationals. The publicity during 
the evacuation process that grossly exaggerated the level of instability 
and fighting in the Pochentong airport was also depressing to Hun 
Sen. Hun Sen knew that on July 9th, the airport was totally clear of 
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Ranariddh loyalist troops. In this turmoil China’s olive branch was 
quickly accepted by Hun Sen. Hun Sen’s expulsion of the Taiwan 
trading office in Phnom Penh was not merely a result of the Taiwan 
military aid toward General NBC but also to satisfy China. Paul Mark 
noted : “Hun Sen’s expulsion of Taiwan’s liaison office endeared him 
to China and opened the door for Chinese diplomatic initiatives” 
(Marks, 2000). Chinese diplomats had approached Hun Sen needed 
the international support for his new government and offered Hun Sen 
well before he expelled Taiwan’s liaison officers. China knew that Hun 
Sen needed the international support for his new government and 
offered Hun Sen full political recognition, on one condition: Taiwan’s 
unofficial liaison office must quickly be closed. In mid-August 1997 
Hun Sen and Ung Huot (the new FUNCINPEC First Prime Minister) 
travelled to Beijing to visit King Sihounuk. Chinese Premier Li Peng 
told Hun Sen and Ung Huot that China would “never interfere” in 
Cambodia’s internal politics, and that Cambodia’s problems “must be 
resolved by the Cambodian people.” (Marks, 2000). 
 Element Number 2 : Information  
China’s move to quickly proclaim its recognition to Hun Sen was 
undoubtely based on accurate information provided by Chinese 
descendent network in Phnom Penh. Cambodia’s ethnic Chinese, like 
other ethnic Chinese in ASEAN countries, were the elite society in 
terms of financial and educational achievements. Their numbers in 
Cambodia were not significant, but they became stronger after the 
Chinese government provided them with capital, both official and 
private. In return, the Chinese expatriates used the Cambodia’s ethnic 
Chinese as lobbyist to bridge the gap inside the Cambodia coalition 
government in order to gain business concession. 
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 Element Number 3 : Economic Support  
It is also no doubt that China’s extraordinary support to 
Cambodian economy was a win-win solution that benefited both 
China and Cambodia in aftermath of the 5-6 July crisis. In 2008, the 
China National Chemical Engineering Group Corporation will build an 
oil refinery in Sihanoukville, Cambodia capable of processing 40,000 
barrels a day. The refinery will likely cost more than $400 million 
(www.irrawaddy.org, 2008). 
Conclusion 
There are always opportunities in the middle of crisis. After the July 
1997 “coup” and amid the sanctions imposed in the Hun Sen regime, 
China’s recognition of the Cambodia displayed strong diplomatic support for 
the new government and reinforced its strategic position as the leading 
nation in Southeast Asia.  
The timely use of nonmilitary element of statecraft by China in the 
turmoil of Cambodia, 1997 was the keystone of China’s future influence in 
the Southeast Asia region. Using a soft power approach, China successfully 
co-opted Hun Sen, who had hated China for decades. 
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